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Abstract
We investigate the effect of changes in unemployment insurance (UI) rules in 
Hungary on the outflow rate from the UI register. Existing claims to UI are 
"grandfathered" in Hungary when UI rules change - new rules are applied only to 
new claims and existing claims continue to be administered under the old rules. 
Entitlement periods to UI were cut substantially at the start of 1993 and using non- 
parametric methods we compare the outflow rate from claims beginning in January 
1993 with those beginning in December 1992 - a total sample size of 80,000 claims. 
Differences in job exit hazards between the December and January samples are 
found for some work history groups but there are no sharp rises in the hazards 
before expiry of UI entitlement. Hazards of exits to labour market programmes do 
rise just before UI expiry. The results suggest the unemployed in Hungary to be 
fairly inelastic to changes in UI benefits.
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A notable feature of the labour market in Hungary is the low outflow rate 
from unemployment, a characteristic in common with labour markets in several 
other Eastern European countries. The rise in registered unemployment to about 14 
percent of the labour force in early 1993 resulted more from a very low outflow rate 
than from a high inflow rate. Inflows each month in 1992 were about 1.0 percent of 
the labour force - a level similar to that in several Western European countries 
(Boeri, 1994) - whereas only 5 percent of the unemployed stock left the register each 
month, a very low figure by Western European standards.
This situation poses two problems for those concerned with design of income 
support for the unemployed. On the one hand, the low outflow rate implies that a 
person’s need for income support will on average last a long time, and well beyond 
the sort of period usually covered by unemployment insurance (UI) benefit. The 
data we use in this paper show that exhaustion of entitlement to benefit is the single 
most likely way for a spell of UI in Hungary to finish. Data from the labour force 
survey show that people unemployed over a year made up more than 40 percent of 
the unemployed stock by the Spring of 1994, up from little more than 10 percent at 
the start of 1992. Large numbers of unemployed then lack income support from the 
state altogether or they must rely on support from a social assistance scheme which 
until recently had received little attention from the Hungarian government (and 
which is much less generous than UI). By June 1994 the numbers of registered 
unemployed receiving social assistance equalled the number receiving UI, who made 
up little more than a third of the unemployed stock.
On the other hand the question arises of whether the low outflow rate is in 
part caused by disincentives present in the unemployment benefit system. The 
principal cause of unemployment in Hungary to date has surely been a sharp fall in 
output caused by demand and supply side shocks, with GDP falling by over 20 
percent during 1990-93. However, a number of commentators have argued that the 
UI system in Hungary is generous both in absolute terms and relative to systems in 



























































































has been a contributory factor to the emergence and the continuation of high levels 
of unemployment. The existence of a large informal economy in pre-reform Hungary 
- which has undoubtedly continued - fuels fears that the benefit system provides a 
substantial subsidy to this form of activity.
We have argued elsewhere that the Hungarian benefit system is more 
complicated than is often appreciated, making difficult both assessment of its 
generosity and comparison with other countries (Micklewright and Nagy, 1994). 
And allegations of large disincentives ignore the point that unemployment benefit in 
Eastern Europe was introduced in order to permit unemployment to emerge in 
economies where it had not previously occurred in open form. Nevertheless, the 
question remains o f whether at the margin the benefit system in Hungary induces a 
low level of search behaviour. Data from the Labour Force Survey are suggestive - a 
third of unemployment benefit recipients interviewed in the third quarter of 1993 
were not classified as unemployed in the ILO/OECD sense of both searching and 
available for work, although many of these were classified as discouraged workers.
Our aim in this paper is to try and produce more concrete evidence than has 
hitherto been available on disincentives within the Hungarian unemployment 
benefit system. In particular, we look at the extent to which differences in the speed 
at which people leave registered unemployment in Hungary are caused by 
differences in their UI benefit entitlements. Preoccupation with incentives might 
seem an issue of second order magnitude in the face of sharp drops in output during 
transition and the restructuring of the economic system. But at the very least the 
issue is worthy o f attention so as to allow the income support role of the benefit 
system to be discussed more dispassionately. Moreover, there has been a steady fall 
in unemployment since its peak in the first quarter of 1993 (something true of both 
registered unemployment and unemployment defined on ILO/OECD criteria of 
search and availability - see Figure 1) and the weak recovery in 1994 may imply 
that attention to the supply side of the labour market should take on more 
relevance.
If the benefit system in Hungary has had a significant impact on behaviour, 




























































































effect. There have been repeated changes to the system since unemployment benefit 
was first introduced in 1989. The last major reform occurred in January 1993 when 
entitlement periods to unemployment insurance (UI) were cut by a third (the 
maximum falling from 18 to 12 months) and benefit amounts were also changed (in 
general reduced). It is on the effect of this change in UI rules that our analysis in 
this paper is focused.1 The analysis is a simple one and exploits the fact that 
existing claims to UI in Hungary are "grandfathered" when the rules governing UI 
receipt are changed - the new rules are applied only to new claims and existing 
claims continue to be administered under the old rules. We compare exit rates from 
the UI register for claims starting in the month before and the month after the 
change in rules, this comparison providing a "quasi-experiment" (Meyer, 1988) of 
the effects of the UI changes.
Section 2 describes the features of the Hungarian UI system that are central 
to our analysis, including the key issue of the differences in the pre- and post- 
January 1993 rules. It also describes the data we analyse, which provide 
information on some 80,000 claims to UI. This large sample size offers the hope of 
pinning down any effects of the changes in benefit rules with some precision. In 
Section 3 we use non-parametric techniques to look at how the probability of leaving 
the register changes over a spell of UI, comparing claimants receiving under the pre- 
and post-January 1993 rules. The data allow us to distinguish exits to employment 
from exit to range of other states, including labour market programmes and this 
turns out to be an important distinction when considering UI effects. Section 4 
concludes.
1. In one sense the impact of the reduction of entitlement periods on the level of 
registered unemployment is obvious. It appears that less than half of those who 
exhaust UI qualify for means-tested social benefit and there is little incentive for the 
others to remain registered. So one would expect a reduction in entitlement periods 
to reduce the registered unemployed stock (albeit with a lag since changes affect 
only new claims) even if  there were no change in behaviour. What we are concerned 
with shedding light on in this paper however are the behavioural changes that may 




























































































2. THE HUNGARIAN UI SYSTEM AND THE DATA FROM ITS
REGISTERS
This section has two purposes. First, we need to provide the reader with 
sufficient information about the Hungarian UI system to understand the analysis of 
its effects that follows. Second, we have to explain the microdata from the 
administrative registers of the UI system that we use, and in doing so we focus on 
whether inflow samples drawn from immediately before and after the new rules 
were introduced on the 1st of January 1993 can be reasonably viewed as providing a 
"controlled experiment" of the effects of UI change. We refer to the rules applying 
before and after that date as the "92 scheme" and the "93 scheme".
Unemployment Insurance in Hungary
The Hungarian UI system is quite complex with substantial variation in 
entitlement periods and benefit formula (Micklewright and Nagy, 1994). Eligibility 
depends in the first instance on employment history in the four years prior to a 
claim. At least 12 months of work is required in this period in order to qualify for 
any benefit. The period of entitlement then depends on the length of the work 
record; 12 months work results in the minimum period and 4 years of work brings 
the maximum. Length of entitlement is a step function of the work record and there 
are 10 different entitlement periods in all (including the maximum and minimum). 
The January 1993 changes cut all 10 entitlement periods by one third. The 
minimum fell from 4V6 months to 3 months and the maximum from 18 months to 12 
months. Long entitlement periods are common in practice. In the sample we 
analyse, nearly two-thirds of claimants have entitlement periods at or near the 
maximum.
The level of benefit is a function of (unindexed) gross earnings in the four 
complete calendar quarters prior to the claim. The formula that is applied depends 
on the duration of unemployment. There is a more generous formula early in the 




























































































two-thirds o f the total entitlement period in the 92 scheme but since 1st January 
1993 it lasts only for the first quarter.
The schedules relating benefit to earnings have the piece-wise linear 
formulae shown in Figure 2. Benefit in period 1 in the 1992 scheme was set at 70 
percent of past earnings, shown by the thick solid line in the figure. If the 
application of this formula produced a monthly benefit figure less than the current 
minimum wage then benefit was set equal to the latter. But if the past earnings fall 
below the current minimum wage then benefit was set equal to past earnings. 
Maximum benefit was twice the minimum wage. The thick dashed line shows how 
the schedule was modified in period 2 when the formal benefit-earnings ratio was 50 
percent. The January 1993 changes actually increased the formal benefit-earnings 
ratios in both period 1 and period 2 to 75 percent and 60 percent respectively but the 
maximum benefit in period 2 was reduced to about 1.7 times the minimum wage 
and a figure about 5 percent lower than the minimum wage was taken as the 
criterion for modifying the formula at the lower end of the distribution.
The higher incidence of unemployment among the lower paid and the lack of 
any indexing provisions for past earnings result in the bottom two pieces of the 
formula in each period determining the benefit of the majority of claimants. This 
may be seen from the arrows pointing to the horizontal axis in Figure 2. Using the 
data on the December 1992 and January 1993 inflow to the UI registers described 
below we calculated for each individual the ratio of his or her (unindexed) past 
earnings to the February 1993 minimum wage. The arrows show the bottom decile, 
lower quartile, median, upper quartile and top decile of this distribution. Nearly a 
half of the sample have earnings that would be sufficiently low for the provisions 
relating to the minimum wage in the 92 scheme to bind. About 1 in 5 have earnings 
that are less than the minimum wage. There are substantial differences in the 
position for men and women since the latter are on average lower paid and the 
domination of the low earnings provisions in their case is really striking 
(Micklewright and Nagy, 1994).
It can be seen from the above that the changes introduced in January 1993 




























































































cut in the period of total entitlement by one third is the most obvious feature. If the 
actual spell of unemployment is short then the total benefit received in the spell can 
be higher in the 93 scheme on account of the increase in the formal benefit-earnings 
ratios in both periods. This would be true if someone with maximum entitlement 
period were to have a spell shorter than about 20 weeks. But beyond this point the 
increase in importance of period 2 in the 93 scheme would result in total benefit 
falling and the low outflow rate from the register means that the great majority of 
claimants have lower total benefit over a spell under the 1993 rules. A person 
exhausting UI under the 93 scheme after a maximum entitlement period of 12 
months would have received total benefit by this time of about 10 percent less than 
under the 92 scheme rules under which of course there would also be a further 6 
months of entitlement to run. Moreover, these calculations presume that the formal 
benefit-earnings ratios apply throughout. Figure 2 shows that those affected by the 
maximum benefit rule and by the formulae applying to low earnings would be 
unlikely to ever receive higher benefit under the 93 scheme.
What happens after UI exhaustion? This question is clearly critical to an 
analysis of the impact of changes in rules relating to the duration of UI entitlement.
On exhausting UI an individual may apply for Social Benefit, eligibility for which 
depends on household income. The scheme is administered and paid for by local 
governments although recipients are obliged to remain registered as unemployed 
with the local employment office. Per capita household income must not exceed 80 
percent of the minimum pension, a level equal to about two-thirds of the minimum 
wage. However, the amount of Social Benefit paid is not means-tested and is paid at 
a flat-rate equal to the value of this cut-off fine (although local governments can pay 
more at their discretion.) The simple per capita adjustment used in calculating 
eligibility would appear to favour families with children although it should be noted 
that family allowance (which is generous in Hungary) is taken into account in the 
calculation. A married claimant with a spouse earning two-thirds of the average 
wage and with two dependent children would not qualify for Social Benefit and 
receipt seems likely to be restricted to those with large families where no other 




























































































Social Benefit (which may also be claimed by those entering unemployment who 
have exhausted their UI entitlement in earlier spells) surprisingly little is known 
about its receipt. Less than 50 percent o f UI exhausters are thought to qualify and 
we show below that termination of UI will typically lead to a big drop in benefit 
income for those that do manage to qualify, which is not surprising given the level of 
Social Benefit in relation to the minimum wage.
Data from the UI Registers
To enable us to focus on the effects of the introduction of the 93 scheme we 
use data relating to persons with new spells of benefit recorded in the UI registers 
as starting in December 1992 and January 1993. We start with the complete inflow 
in those months, which is 100,392 individuals - about 2'/i percent of the 
economically active population aged 20-59. From this sample (we use the word for 
convenience although we have the inflow population in the months concerned) we 
discard two types of persons. The first are those who quit their last job voluntarily. 
Quitting led to a 3 month delay in UI receipt under the 92 scheme and 6 months 
under the 93 scheme. Our January sample should therefore contain no spell of 
benefit starting under the 93 scheme as the result of a quit. The data for both 
December and January contain UI spells administered under the 92 scheme 
relating to claims for benefit made in the Autumn of 1992 but we discard these so as 
to achieve a sample for December 1992 which matches that for January 1993 as 
closely as possible. For the same reason we discard those receiving statutory 
severance pay prior to UI. This also delays the start of UI payments (from 1 to 6 
months depending on the work record) and again means that no spell of UI 
following a period of severance pay and administered under the 1993 rules should 
be found in our January data. As a result of these two decisions we discard more 
than 25 percent of spells administered under the 1992 rules (in about three-fifths of 
cases due to severance pay).2 We are left with a sample of 80,711 spells, all relating
2. For reasons that are not clear here are in fact a few spells under the 93 





























































































to people who lost their job and who did not receive statutory severance pay. Of 
these 50,441 are administered under the 92 scheme and 30,270 are administered 
under the new rules operating from 1st January 1993.
The 92 scheme sample is the substantially larger one. Is it possible that 
people who would otherwise have entered the register in January 1993 made their 
claim to UI in December 1992 in order to benefit from the more generous set of rules 
in operation at that time? If so and i f  the people concerned had a lower desire to 
leave the register then we would be unable to tell whether differences in the speed of 
return to work between 92 and 93 scheme people were due to the lower taste for 
work of the former (or, of course, some other unobserved difference between the two 
groups) or the reduced benefit entitlement of the latter.
In considering this issue we need to remember that the individuals under 
investigation are all officially job losers rather than quitters, although of course 
some may have volunteered for redundancy. This must limit the extent to which 
they can control their date of registering a claim to benefit. In the first instance this 
obviously depends on the date of job loss which may be entirely out of their control. 
Following job loss the date of claim to UI is however an individual decision and the 
92 scheme people are in fact somewhat quicker at registering their claims - see 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 1. The median lag from the date of job loss is only 2 days 
for them and the upper quartile 9 days, compared to 7 and 33 days for the 93 
scheme claimants.'5
Awareness of the introduction of the change in the rules of the UI system at 
the end of 1992 is difficult to judge. The amendment to the relevant employment 
law was made as late as December 23rd but the main measures, including the 
changes in entitlement periods, had been discussed within the Ministry of Labour 
since at least September (although there had been substantial uncertainty 3
3. If a shorter lag signifies a greater willingness to live on benefit then these 
differences would still be a concern even if  there had been complete ignorance of the 
imminent change in the benefit rules among those becoming unemployed in 
December 1992. Those with less desire to live on benefit would have got caught by 
the change in the rules and the December and January inflows would still differ in 




























































































surrounding the date the new measures would be introduced). At least one mass 
circulation daily newspaper announced the substance of the forthcoming changes 
(but not of course the date they would be effective) in October. It is possible that 
some enterprises shedding staff in December may have warned their employees of 
imminent changes and advised them to claim quickly.4 5
As far as the size of the two inflows are concerned, it is - surprisingly - 
impossible to establish from published figures whether or not the December 1992 
inflow was abnormally large. Monthly inflow figures published by the National 
Labour Centre are from the 20th of one month to the 19th o f the following month 
and they do not record entrants reported late by local employment offices, which 
appears to result in a substantial under-estimate of the inflow (Micklewright and 
Nagy, 1994a). Enterprises may only make large layoffs with prior notification to the 
Ministry of Labour of one or three months (depending on the numbers of involved). 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the date of introduction of the new benefit rules 
it seems unlikely that layoffs in December 1992 were substantially affected by the 
introduction of the new scheme. The tax year coincides with the calendar year in 
Hungary and this may be one reason for enterprises shedding more staff in 
December than in January.0 It should be noted that the majority of those on the 93 
scheme actually lost their jobs in December, rather than January - 61 percent have 
a last date of employment in December and among these nearly half lost their jobs 
on the last day of the year.
Table 1 compares a number of observed personal characteristics of the 92 
scheme and 93 scheme samples, a comparison that is in any case important when 
interpreting any non-parametric analysis of the spell data that does not control for 
observables. Columns 1 and 2 relate to the full sample (obtained after the selection 
rules given above). The gender composition is virtually identical, men making up
4. Large enterprises do appear to keep abreast of changing legislation affecting 
unemployment benefit. A local employment office manager told us in October 1994 
that he had heard of new draft changes to the unemployment benefit system from 
an employer and not from head office!
5. Checking a sample of the stock of UI recipients in March 1992 we find that 




























































































over two-thirds o f the inflow, and there are only slight differences in educational 
level, manual/non-manual status, average age, and average base period earnings. 
There are rather larger differences in the geographical breakdown of the two groups.
The biggest differences are for the two areas with the lowest and highest 
unemployment rates, the capital Budapest city and the county of Szabolcs in the 
north-east of the country. The former is much more strongly represented in the 93 
scheme sample and the latter in the 92 sample. Looking at several other months of 
inflow data it seems that the representation o f these two counties in the 93 scheme 
inflow is the more typical. However, when we divide the 20 Hungarian counties into 
two groups on the basis of the outflow rate from the register in the summer of 1992, 
the composition of the 92 and 93 scheme samples in terms of high and low outflow 
counties is very similar. The incidence of an earlier spell of UI in the register 
records (this can be at any time since 1989) is somewhat higher in the 92 scheme 
sample. (The quite high incidence in both samples - around 30 percent - is of some 
interest and shows that as in Western labour markets there is a significant degree of 
recurrent unemployment in Hungary.)
The last characteristic considered in Table 1 is employment history, where we 
have grouped the first 8 of the 10 periods into two (12-27 months and 28-44 months).
Those with a history of continuous work in the four years prior to claiming benefit 
obtain the maximum entitlement, and this is easily the modal period for claimants 
under both schemes. But the maximum is notably more common among 92 scheme 
claimants, applying to 43 percent of men and 52 percent of women compared to 36 
percent and 40 percent respectively under the 93 scheme. (The contrast between the 
schemes is rather less marked if we also include the group with the next best work 
history.) It is difficult to know how to interpret these differences. It might be 
argued that those with the best work history had the biggest incentive to register a 
claim under the 92 scheme and what we are seeing in Table 1 is consistent with 
income-maximising claim behaviour. On the other hand, all entitlement periods 
were longer by the same proportion under the 92 scheme. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 




























































































Differences in the speed of claim are somewhat smaller than in the full sample, 
while differences in occupation, education and county are slightly bigger.
Are these differences in characteristics of 92 and 93 scheme claimants greater 
than those we would expect from looking at the inflow in a pair of consecutive 
months when there was no change in the UI rules? We also have data from the 
inflow in April and May 1994 (from which we again exclude those with severance 
pay and voluntary quitters).6 The differences between the characteristics of 
claimants in these two months are small. Notably, differences are also small 
between geographical distribution and work histories in the April-May 1994 
samples in contrast to the December 1992 and January 1993 samples. For example, 
the proportions with a maximum entitlement period differ by only 2 percent points 
compared to 9 points with the earlier pair of months. Of course, the comparisons 
may be affected by the seasonal difference. A better comparison would be between 
December 1991 and January 1992, which would also have the advantage of 
spanning a change in tax year.
It is clear that the December 1992 and January 1993 inflow samples differ in 
several respects, although are very similar in others. On balance we think it 
unlikely that the former contains a disproportionate number of persons with a high 
propensity to stay on benefit, who made sure that they claimed under the more 
generous 92 scheme.
To complete our description of the data, Table 2 provides some information on 
the levels of UI benefit in payment. The first part of the table shows benefit in 
period 1 and period 2 as a percentage of previous earnings, where the latter are the 
earnings during the relevant base period used to calculate benefit but indexed to 
January 1993. Period 1 lasts for the first two-thirds of the benefit period in the 92 
scheme but only the first quarter in the 93 scheme. Both benefit and earnings are 
gross. (The effect of personal income taxation on the comparison is not obvious and 
is discussed in Micklewright and Nagy, 1994.) The adjustment of the basic benefit- 
eammgs formula for low and high earnings together with wage inflation during the





























































































base period (and in any lag before entry to unemployment) means that the 
"standard" period 1 rates of 70 percent in the 92 scheme and 75 percent in the 93 
scheme are a poor guide to replacement rates faced in practice. Median period 1 
replacement rates on the 92 scheme are 59 percent for men and 68 percent for 
women - more women being affected by the rules governing low earnings. The 
median is notably higher for men on the 93 scheme but not for women.
Viewed relative to previous earnings, UI benefit may appear quite generous 
for the majority of claimants. In absolute terms the benefits are much less generous.
The minimum wage, which played a big part in the determination of benefit for 
many unemployed people in the 92 scheme, was about equal in December 1992 to 
the per capita minimum subsistence income level calculated by the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office for a 2-adult/2-child household. Of course, this also 
illustrates the low living standards provided by jobs at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution.
The bottom part of Table 2 gives information on the ratio of UI benefit in 
period 2 (net of the 6 percent social insurance contribution levied on the 
unemployed) to the level of Social Benefit paid in January 1994 (the time when the 
modal work history group on the 93 scheme would exhaust UI). The calculation is 
made for all claimants in the sample and not just those who actually exhaust UI 
entitlement. The table shows the distribution of the drop in benefit income that 
would be experienced were all the sample to qualify for Social Benefit. In reality 
less than a half of those who do exhaust UI would probably get this form of benefit. 
UI in period 2 exceeds the Social Benefit level by over 40 percent for more than 90 
percent of the sample and by over 50 percent for more than half. Broadly speaking, 
we can say that about half of people exhausting UI will not qualify for Social Benefit 
and among those that do about half will lose at least a third of their benefit income. 
The exhaustion of UI therefore has considerable consequences for benefit income in 




























































































3. SPELL DURATIONS AND EXIT RATES - NON-PARAMETRIC 
ANALYSIS
If the 92 and 93 scheme samples are sufficiently similar in observable and 
unobservable characteristics then differences in spell durations between claimants 
on the two schemes should be the result of different entitlements to benefit. The 
shorter entitlement periods of the 93 scheme should exert a downward pressure on 
reservation wages and in addition have a positive effect on search intensity. It is 
worth noting that the individual is fully informed of his or her benefit entitlement 
after a claim had been decided upon by the local employment office; national 
guidelines require local offices to inform the claimant in writing of the level of 
benefit in both period 1 and period 2 and of the day that entitlement will expire.
Each spell in the data is traced through the administrative registers of the UI 
system until it finishes through an exit to a job, a government labour market 
programme, exhaustion of entitlement to UI, or some other reason. Investigation of 
local office practices indicates that the exit state coded on each spell is very reliable 
and in only a few cases is the state unknown (those labeled as censored in Table 3). 
The distribution of exit states is shown in Table 3. Exit to a job is the most common 
outcome overall but there is a big difference in its importance for men and women - 
nearly a half of men on both the 92 and 93 schemes leave to a job but only one third 
of women, for whom exhaustion of UI entitlement is the single most common way of 
leaving the register. (Taking 93 scheme claimants of both sexes together, 
exhaustion is the most common form of exit overall and this is the basis for our 
comment on the frequency of exhaustion in the Introduction.) Some form of labour 
market program (including early retirement) accounts for nearly 1 in 10 exits. The 
fact that the job exits are almost as common for 93 scheme claimants as for 92 
scheme claimants, despite their shorter entitlement periods, is of some note 
although exhaustion is certainly more common on the 93 scheme.
In comparing the speed of exit of claimants in the two schemes we divide the 





























































































We start with the modal group of continuous employment in the last four 
years, which brings a maximum entitlement period to benefit. Everyone in this sub­
sample had continuous employment in the 4 years prior to the claim. Survivor 
functions are shown in Figure 3. The functions finish at the end of the entitlement 
periods to benefit, 360 days for the 93 scheme and 540 days for the 92 scheme.7
We see immediately that the survivor functions for both men and women on 
the 93 scheme lie well below those for 92 scheme claimants - people receiving under 
the 1993 rules move off the register more quickly than those receiving under the 
1992 rules. At the one year point, when entitlement ceases under the 1993 rules, 
only 32 percent of men in the 93 scheme were still receiving UI while 47 percent of 
their counterparts under the 92 scheme were still in the register - nearly half as 
many again. Among women, 45 percent o f 93 scheme claimants survive to one year 
whereas 57 percent of those on the 92 scheme are still receiving UI at this point. 
The comparison of the survivor functions for men and women reflects what we saw 
in Table 3 - women leave the register more slowly and are much more likely to 
exhaust UI.
At first sight the sharply contrasting rates of survival in the register for 92 
and 93 scheme claimants seems strong evidence in support o f the hypothesis that 
the shorter benefit period (and somewhat lower benefit level) faced by the latter 
increased their intensity of search and/or reduced their reservation wages. 
However, closer inspection of the survival functions casts some doubt on such a 
simple explanation for the observed differences. In particular, the male survivor 
functions diverge sharply at an early point - at around 70-90 days - and thereafter 
run roughly parallel to each other. It is difficult to think of why benefit-induced 
differences in behaviour of claimants on the two schemes should be concentrated so
7. The survivor functions are estimated with the usual Kaplan-Meier method, 





























































































early in the spell when even under the 93 scheme there was still some 9 months of 
benefit entitlement to run.
Figures 4a-4d shed more light on the issue by looking at the empirical 
hazards. These diagrams give the probability of leaving the register to go to a job 
(Figures 4a and 4b) and any other register exit (Figures 4c and 4d) in a given 
interval of time conditional on surviving all risks of exit up until the start of the 
interval. The intervals are defined as two weeks long. Figure 4a shows an 
enormous surge in the job hazard for men on the 93 scheme just before the three 
month point, the hazard increasing some four or five-fold from its average level in 
the first few weeks (or that around the six month point). (This increase is highly 
significant, the 95 percent confidence interval around the peak of 0.0086 is from 
0.008 to 0.0093.) There is also a rise for men on the 92 scheme at the same point in 
calendar time (on average the 92 scheme men entered the register about 30 days 
earlier) although it is notably lower - about half that of the 93 scheme hazard. From 
this point onwards the hazards are very similar, although the 93 scheme hazard 
remains a little higher.
The second point to note from Figure 4a is that there is little apparent rise in 
the 93 scheme hazard as the point of exhaustion of entitlement at one year draws 
near. This is true both in relation to the hazard for claimants under the 93 rules in 
earlier periods (which could be explained by seasonal factors in late 1993) but also in 
relation to the hazard for 92 scheme claimants over the same period. In the final 
two week period there is a slight upturn in the 93 scheme hazard that we do not see 
for the 92 scheme. The difference is significant but it is very small. Similarly, there 
is no surge in the hazard for 92 scheme claimants just before their entitlement 
expires 6 months later at the 18 month point. We cannot tell whether the steady 
gradual rise in the hazard during the first half o f 1994 for these claimants is benefit- 
induced due to the approaching end of entitlement or whether it is due to an upturn 
in the labour market.
It seems likely that seasonal factors combined with an exceptional increase in 
hiring by employers is the principal cause of the singe in the male job hazard at 




























































































increase a year later for the 92 scheme claimants who are still on the register, 
although this may represent a sorting affect.) The stock of registered vacancies hit a 
three-year high in Spring 1993 and reached the highest level yet recorded in the 
1990s, before falling back substantially in the rest of the year. (The change, as 
opposed to the level, does seem seasonal however; vacancies rose 50 percent between 
January and May 1993 and 125 percent and 25 percent between the same two 
months in 1991 and 1993 respectively.) Figure 5 shows the outflow rate to jobs from 
the stock of UI recipients during March 1992-December 1993. The outflow rate 
increased almost three-fold between December 1992 and April 1993, the latter date 
seeing the highest monthly outflow rate during the 19 months in the diagram. In 
other words, the outflow rose sharply for all UI recipients at this time and not just 
for the December and January inflow cohorts that we investigate in this paper. 
Looking back at Figure 1 we see that this is the period when unemployment began 
to fall in Hungary.
There remains the issue of why the 93 scheme hazard increases more sharply 
in Spring 1993 than that for 92 scheme claimants and it seems unlikely that it is 
associated with their shorter period of entitlement to benefit.8 The three month 
point is the time at which the more generous period 1 finishes for those with 
maximum entitlement but it is difficult to think of an argument explaining what we 
see that involves this. The formal benefit-earnings ratio at this time is higher on the 
93 scheme than on the 92 scheme and it falls at the three month point rather less 
than that at the (later) switch from period 1 to period 2 under the 92 scheme. This 
leaves the possibility that the 93 scheme claimants have characteristics that on 
average allowed them to benefit more from the upsurge in demand at this time, 
although we have seen in Table 1 that in terms of observable characteristics the two 
groups are quite similar. One characteristic we cannot control for is being on 
temporary layoff. It is possible that a greater proportion of men with a continuous
8. It might be argued that the 1993 scheme claimants perceive the Spring of 
that year as being their only chance of benefiting from a favourable seasonal 
upswing in demand while those on the 92 scheme perceive that they have a further 





























































































employment history who enter the registers in January were on temporary layoff 
than those entering the register in December and that the upswing in the labour 
market in Spring 1993 led to higher numbers of 93 scheme claimants being recalled.
Figure 4b shows the job hazards for women and we draw attention to the 
difference in vertical scale from Figure 4a. The hazard for 93 scheme women lies 
everywhere above that for the 92 scheme, in general being between 10 and 50 
percents higher. Note that there is a much smaller rise around the 3 month point, of 
about 50 percent for the 93 scheme claimants compared to other periods. Whatever 
happened in the Hungarian labour market in Spring 1993 seems to have favoured 
the job prospects of unemployed men with good work histories much more than 
unemployed women.
Figures 4c and 4d show the hazards of exit to the other labour market states 
described in Table 3 for men and women respectively (in this case the graphs have 
the same scale). These include various active labour market programs of subsidised 
work and training together with normal and early retirement. For both men and 
women the other exits hazard jumps at 180 days since it is at this point that 
eligibility for various labour market programmes begins and those within 3 years of 
normal retirement age become eligible for early retirement (the decision to allow 
early retirement is at the discretion of the local employment office). The 93 scheme 
hazards are in general somewhat above those for the 92 scheme. Hazards for both 
schemes and both sexes rise sharply and significantly just before the exhaustion 
point (less so for women on the 93 scheme). This suggests that both claimants 
and/or local employment offices look harder for available labour market programs 
when benefit entitlement is close to expiry, although it should be noted that the rises 
in the hazards at this point are not enormous and the great majority o f those leaving 





























































































Employment history o f 44-47 months
Figure 6 and Figures 7a-7d give survivor and hazard functions for claimants 
with 44-47 months work in the previous 4 years - a group that make up a fifth of the 
sample (the most numerous group after those with a continuous employment 
history). There are some marked differences from the graphs for the continuous 
employment history group. Looking first at the survivor functions, which in this 
case end at the slightly shorter entitlement periods of 330 days and 495 days, we 
again see a big difference between men and women that emerges early on. This is of 
course what we saw in Figure 3 but in Figure 6 the values of the survivor functions 
for both sexes at the point when benefit expires in the 93 scheme are almost 
identical for 92 and 93 scheme claimants. Comparison with Figure 3 shows that it is 
the survivor functions o f the 92 scheme claimants that are different in this case. 
Whereas 93 scheme claimants in the two work history groups - 48 months and 44-47 
months employment - leave the register at more or less the same speed as each other 
(something true of both sexes) the 92 scheme claimants with continuous work 
history leave the register much more slowly than those with a small interruption in 
their work record (or those too young to have worked 4 complete years).
The hazards in Figures 7a-7d again shed more light. The job exit hazards for 
men (Figure 7a) on the two schemes are virtually identical when one bears in mind 
that the 92 scheme men enter the register a month earlier (so they are "hit" by the 
Spring surge in outflows a month later). And they are also very similar to that for 
93 scheme claimants with continuous work history shown earlier in Figure 4a, 
underlining the fact that it is hazard of the 92 scheme continuous work history 
group that is exceptional. The peak of the job exit hazard for women is higher on 
the 92 scheme than on the 93 scheme. And, as for the continuous employment 
history group, for neither sex is there a jump in the job exit hazard shortly before 
expiry of UI entitlement, although we again see increases in the other exits hazard 
on both schemes at this point. The conclusion for this employment history group 
seems to be that the introduction of the 93 scheme had no effect at all on the job exit 




























































































Employment history o f up to 43 months
Figures 8 and 9 show the survivor functions for the remainder of the sample 
who all have shorter employment histories.9 We have grouped the eight work 
history periods concerned into two, 28-43 months and 12-27 months. In both cases 
the survivor functions for the 93 scheme lie somewhat below those of the 92 scheme 
and in the case of the 28-43 months group we again see evidence that the upturn in 
the labour market in Spring 1993 benefited men more than women. The job exit 
hazards are shown in Figures lOa-lOd. Figure 10a shows quite clearly that once we 
have taken into account the one month earlier entry of those receiving under the 
1992 rules, the job exit hazards of 92 and 93 scheme claimants with 28-43 months 
employment are very similar - the 92 scheme group being affected by the "Spring 
surge" one month later, this accounting for the relative positions of the survivor 
functions in Figure 8. The same appears to apply (although with somewhat less 
clarity) for women in Figure 10b and for men with 12-27 months employment 
history in Figure 10c.10 Again, the conclusion for these employment history groups 
appears to be that the introduction of the 93 scheme had little effect on job exit 
hazards.
9. The survivor functions in both Figures 8 and 9 (and the hazards in Figure 10) 
are estimated using groups with various entitlement periods and we treat UI 
exhaustion as censoring when obtaining the estimates.
10. It should be noted that standard errors of the estimated hazards are quite 
large in some instances in Figures lOa-lOd. For example, the hazard of 0.0039 in 
the last fortnight of entitlement for men with 12-27 months employment on the 93 
scheme has a 95 percent confidence interval of 0.0026-0.0053 and that for women of 





























































































The following points seems clear from the non-parametric analysis of the
data.
• For most employment history groups we have found little or no evidence that the 
introduction of the 93 scheme raised the job exit hazard when we take into 
account the slightly later point at which 92 scheme claimants encountered the 
increase in labour demand in the Spring of 1993.
• The speed of return to work is only markedly higher on the 93 scheme claimants 
compared to 92 scheme claimants for individuals with continuous employment 
histories, but For men, the hazards diverge sharply only early on in the 
entitlement period, which is not easily explained by an incentives story. One 
possible explanation that may contribute to this pattern is that the 93 scheme 
claimants had a higher recall probability to the previous job, but at present this 
must remain speculation.
• There appears to be very little rise in the job exit hazard near the time when 
benefit expires. In short, there is no evidence that large numbers of claimants 
are putting off taking a job until just before their UI entitlement runs out. Of 
course, it is an open question as to what happens after UI expiry. The possibility 
of Social Benefit following exhaustion of UI entitlement, albeit paid at a 
substantially lower rate than UI, may be one reason for the lack of any sharp 
rise in the hazard as UI expiry draws near. It may also help explain the 
apparent lack of much impact on job exits from the introduction of the 93 
scheme. It should however be bom in mind that Social Benefit is probably 
received by only about half o f UI exhausters.
• The exit rate to other labour market states (including subsidised employment) is 
typically a little higher for 93 scheme claimants and does rise just before the 
exhaustion point for claimants on both schemes. This suggests that the 
introduction of a shorter UI entitlement period in 1993 did bring forward the 




























































































programmes or local employment offices offer such programmes to claimants, 
although the numbers involved are small.
Our analysis has been predicated on the assumption that comparison o f 92 
and 93 scheme samples drawn from around the time of changes in the UI rules 
provides a "natural experiment” of the effects of the changes. We showed in Section 
2 that the observed characteristics of the two samples were reasonably similar and 
we argued that it was unlikely that a disproportionately large number those with a 
higher propensity to stay on benefit managed to claim under the more generous 
1992 rules. If we are wrong then we should see higher hazards for the 93 scheme 
claimants. The fact that we do not in general find large differences between the 
hazards of claimants on the two schemes is therefore some evidence against the 
hypothesis that there was widespread income-maximising claim behaviour at the 
time of the changes in UI rules.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have looked at whether differences in the speed at which 
people leave registered unemployment in Hungary are caused by differences in their 
UI benefit entitlements, focusing on the effect of major changes in the UI system in 
January 1993 which substantially reduced entitlements. Broadly speaking, we find 
that the introduction of the new rules was not associated with large increases in exit 
rates from the UI register that are easily explained by a story of increased incentives 
to find work or to move off the register to other destinations. So the conclusion 
would appear to be that the unemployed in Hungary are rather inelastic to changes 
in UI benefit system parameters.
The work we have presented has been simple non-parametric analysis of 
administrative data from UI registers. These data have their advantages (large 
sample sizes and precise measurement of benefit entitlements) but any more 
definite conclusions about unemployment benefits and incentives to work in 




























































































observe claimants after the point of UI expiry when we know whether they have 
qualified or not for Social Benefit, a form of income support for the unemployed in 
Hungary about which far too little is currently known. We need data that provide 
information on the household characteristics of claimants and on other sources of 
income. One aspect of this - which will be very difficult to obtain information on - is 
the involvement of the unemployed in the informal economy. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests this is quite common and the existence of significant income from this 
source may be one reason for changes in UI rules to have little effect. This said, the 
main finding of this paper may be thought rather unsurprising given the broad 
economic picture so far in Hungary during transition and the principal reason for 
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F IG U R E S A N D  TA B LE S
Figure 1: Numbers o f Unemployed in Hungary and Numbers receiving 




























































































Figure 2: Benefit-Earnings Formulae in the 1992 and 1993 Hungarian 
UI schemes
D1 Q1 Q2 Q3 D9 
previous earnings (urindexed) as m itiple of current minimum v«g e
Note:
The arrows below the horizontal axis refer to quantiles of the ratio of unindexed previous 
earnings to the February 1993 minimum wage, calculated using the December 1992 and 
January 1993 inflow samples. D1 is the bottom decile, Q1 the lower quartile, Q2 the 




























































































Figure 3: Survivor Functions for Claimants with Continuous






0 90 1B0 270 360 450 540spell length, days
Note: sample sizes are
14,908 men on 92 scheme 
7,334 men on 93 scheme 
8,071 women on 92 scheme 



































































































Figure 4a: Hazard Functions for Male Claimants with Continuous
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job
Note: sample sizes are 14,908 (92 scheme) and 7,334 (93 scheme)
Figure 4b: Hazard Functions for Female Claimants with Continuous 
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job



































































































Figure 4c: Hazard Functions for Male Claimants with Continuous
Employment in Last 4 Years: Non-job Exits
Note: sample sizes are 14,908 (92 scheme) and 7,334 (93 scheme)
Figure 4d: Hazard Functions for Female Claimants with Continuous 
Employment in Last 4 Years: Non-job Exits




























































































Figure 5: Proportion of the Stock of UI Recipients Leaving the Register
to a Job, March 1992 - December 1993
Source: National Labour Centre




























































































Figure 6: Survivor Functions for Claimants with 44-47 months







Note: sample sizes are
7,612 men on 92 scheme 
4,694 men on 93 scheme 
2,170 women on 92 scheme 



































































































Figure 7a: Hazard Functions for Male Claimants with 44-47 months
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job
Note: sample sizes are 7,612 (92 scheme) and 4,694 (93 scheme)
Figure 7b: Hazard Functions for Female Claimants with 44-47 months 
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job



































































































Figure 7c: Hazard Functions for Male Claimants with 44-47 months
Employment in Last 4 Years: Non-job Exits
Note: sample sizes are 7,612 (92 scheme) and 4,694 (93 scheme)
Figure 7d: Hazard Functions for Female Claimants with 44-47 months 
Employment in Last 4 Years: Non-job Exits




























































































Figure 8: Survivor Functions for Claimants with 28-43 months







Note: sample sizes are
7,275 men on 92 scheme 
5,412 men on 93 scheme 
3,005 women on 92 scheme 




























































































Figure 9: Survivor Functions for Claimants with 12-27 months







Note: sample sizes are
4,598 men on 92 scheme 
3,089 men on 93 scheme 
2,363 women on 92 scheme 



































































































Figure 10a: Hazard Functions for Male Claimants with 28-43 months
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job
Note: sample sizes are 7,275 (92 scheme) and 5,392 (93 scheme)
Figure 10b: Hazard Functions for Female Claimants with 28-43 months 
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job



































































































Figure 10c: Hazard Functions for Male Claimants with 12-27 months
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job
Note: sample sizes are 4,598 (92 scheme) and 3,099 (93 scheme)
Figure lOd: Hazard Functions for Female Claimants with 12-27 months 
Employment in Last 4 Years: Exit to a Job




























































































Table 1: Characteristics of 92 Scheme and 93 Scheme Claimants among
New Spells of UI Starting in December 1992 and January 1993
1. 2. 3. 4.
All work history groups Continuous empi, group
1992 1993 1992 1993
scheme scheme scheme scheme
Days between date of last em­
ployment and start of UI 
payment
median 2 9 2 5
upper quartile 9 33 4 7
top decile 94 212 8 15
proportion:
male 0.686 0.680 0.649 0.656
age (average years) 
education
36.5 35.2 39.0 37.8
primary and below 0.428 0.426 0.424 0.441
vocational 0.491 0.491 0.482 0.472
general secondary and above 0.081 0.083 0.094 0.087
manual 0.854 0.873 0.806 0.846
area
Budapest city 0.063 0.112 0.043 0.075
Szabolcs 0.114 0.069 0.103 0.066
high outflow county 0.382 0.391 0.372 0.406
previous spell of UI 0.300 0.270 0.013 0.012
entry to UI from employment 0.936 0.896 0.994 0.990
base period earnings indexed 
January 1993 (gross Forints per 
months)
17222 16980 17621 17510
work history in previous 4 years
12-27 months 0.139 0.158
28-43 months 0.206 0.260
44-47 months 0.195 0.211
continuous employment 0.460 0.371 1.000 1.000
Notes:
1) Figures based on 50,002 individuals receiving benefits under the 1992 scheme and 30,110 
receiving under the 1993 scheme.
2) Vocational schooling includes vocational secondary schooling.
3) High outflow counties are Bekes, Fejer, Gydr, Hajdu, Somogy, Tolna, Vas, Veszprem and 
Zala. They are the counties with the highest three-month outflow rates for spells of UI 




























































































Table 2: Benefit Levels on the two Schemes
i) ratio of gross UI benefit to indexed base period gross earnings (%)
92 scheme period 1 93 scheme period 1
men I women men j women
bottom decile 56.1 | 57.9 54.3 56.3
median 59.3 1 68.4 67.2 1 67.2
top decile 84.7 j 84.7 84.7 j 87.8
92 scheme period 2 93 scheme period 2
men women men | women
bottom decile 42.4 1 42.4 46.4 | 48.3
median 54.1 j 68.4 53.7 | 66.1
top decile 84.7 j 84.7 84.7 | 87.8
ii) ratio o f period 2 net UI benefit to Social Benefit in January 1994
92 scheme 93 scheme
men women men women
bottom decile 1.46 1.20 1.42 1.21
median 1.56 1.56 1.49 1.49




























































































Table 3: Exit States from the UI Register
Exit state









employment 49.0 34.4 47.0 31.6 43.5
subsidised empl. 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.5 1.0
subsidised self-empl. 1.9 1.2 1.5 0.8 1.5
public works 1.7 0.8 1.4 0.8 1.3
training scheme 1.2 2.7 1.4 3.5 1.8
early retirement 3.5 6.8 1.8 4.5 3.8
normal retirement 1.5 2.4 0.4 1.7 1.5
disqualified 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.3
other 0.1 2.8 1.5 1.7 1.9
UI exhausted 32.8 40.3 38.5 47.8 37.5
spell censored 3.7 4.9 3.3 4.5 3.9
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